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Abstract   
 
Even before the financial crisis many developed economies were facing growing inequality 
and struggling to maintain employment and earnings. As a consequence, extending 
employment opportunities and enhancing earnings over the working life has become a central 
aim of much of recent economic policy. This paper addresses two key questions:  What has 
happened to living standards and inequality? Where will tax and welfare reforms have most 
impact? It uses the recent history of the UK as a running example. The analysis suggests that, 
since the recession, younger families are behaving as if they expect a long-run fall in relative 
living standards. The pattern of sluggish real wages at the bottom looks set to continue and 
longer-term earnings growth will come mostly from high-skilled occupations. The resulting 
growing earnings inequality will bring increasing pressure on the tax and welfare system. The 
key to extending employment and earnings is to focus policy on improving the flows into 
work for people leaving school and for mothers with young children, and on expanding work 
among people in their 50s and 60s. Human capital policy is shown to play a complementary 
role, improving both productivity and the payoff to work, while ensuring stronger earnings 
growth over a lifetime. The evidence points to a blueprint for a coherent and effective tax 
policy that takes a life-cycle view of work and human capital accumulation.  
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1.  Introduction 
Even before the recent crisis, many economies and their governments around the developed 
world faced growing inequality and pressure to increase employment and earnings. The depth 
and duration of the recession added to this pressure and brought further strains on 
government revenues. These problems have become even more severe in economies with 
ageing populations. As a result, extending employment opportunities and enhancing earnings 
over the working life has become a central aim of much of recent economic policy.  
The ideas developed in this paper aim to address these concerns and argue for policies that 
focus on improving the flows into work for people leaving school and for mothers with 
young children, and on expanding work among people in their 50s and 60s. Human capital 
policy is shown to have a key role by improving both productivity and the payoff to work, 
ensuring stronger earnings growth over a lifetime. The evidence points to a blueprint for a 
coherent and effective policy that takes a life-cycle view of work and human capital 
accumulation.  
Using the experience of the UK economy as a running example, the paper addresses two 
central questions:  What has happened to living standards and inequality? Where will tax and 
welfare reform have most impact? The emphasis will be on the labour market and on the 
personal tax and welfare system. As in a majority of developed economies, many of the key 
determinants of trends in income inequality and in overall living standards in the UK over the 
past 25 years have been driven by changes in the labour market and to human capital. These 
include the changes in education, changes in earnings inequality and changes in labour 
productivity.  
Recent research on the linkages between the behaviour of earnings, labour supply, savings 
and household consumption, see Blundell (2014), bring a new understanding to the 
relationship between human capital, inequality and tax reform. To dig a little deeper into this 
relationship, we examine three measures of economic well-being: Earnings: made up of 
employment, wages, human capital and labour productivity; Family Incomes: including the 
impact of the tax and benefit system, family labour supply and capital incomes; and, finally, 
Consumption: highlighting the differences between durables and non-durable expenditures.  
After discussing these underlying trends, the paper examines the prospects for living 
standards, inequality and policy reform. Without dramatic changes in overall labour 
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productivity, the pattern of low and sluggish real wages at the bottom looks set to continue. 
As a consequence, low-skilled workers will increasingly rely on the benefit/tax credit system, 
gifts and family labour supply. Longer-term earnings growth will mostly come from high-
skilled occupations. The resulting growing earnings inequality will bring increasing demands 
on the tax and welfare system. This comes at a time when there is an increased pressure on 
government revenue.  
In terms of policy reform, there is much to be done. As argued in the Mirrlees Review [IFS, 
2011], current tax and welfare systems raise revenue inefficiently and redistribute resources 
unfairly. Instead of a focus on piecemeal reforms, tax and welfare policy should be re-
designed to operate more effectively in enhancing lifetime earnings through three key policy 
elements: improving labour market entry for those leaving school and for women with young 
children; keeping older workers in the labour force; increasing human capital investments.  
The analysis reviewed in this paper points to some potentially big gains. It suggests a path to 
improving long-term trends in employment and earnings that recognizes the role of early 
human capital investments in enhancing the incentive to work and, at the same time, 
enhances the accumulation of human capital while in work. In turn, the prospect of higher net 
income earned later in working life provides an important incentive for human capital 
investments.  The financial crisis and the long recession that followed have not changed the 
agenda for reform; they have simply highlighted the urgency for a coherent reform to the tax 
and welfare system that aims to enhance lifetime earnings and address growing earnings 
inequality. 
 
2. What has happened to living standards and inequality? 
In many countries, including the UK and the US, the inequality of earnings over the last three 
or four decades has increased considerably. Figure 1 presents some key inequality trends for 
the UK since the early 1960s and shows the strong increase in inequality for all measures 
during the 1979 to 1991 period.  The increase in income inequality in the 1980s and early 
1990s was widespread in the UK: inequality increased within and across education groups, 
occupations, cohorts.   
{Figure 1. UK Income Inequality: 50/10, 90/50 and 99/90 ratios} 
 [Note to editor: Figures are gathered at end of the document] 
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In the UK, for the period since the mid-1990s, there has been more stability in overall income 
inequality over much of the income distribution. As we will see, this has been driven, at least 
in part, by redistributive reforms to the tax-credit system and masks growing inequality in 
earnings, especially for younger cohorts. In line with evidence from many developed 
economies, Figure 1 shows that the incomes of the top percentile in the UK have grown at a 
significantly higher rate. 
2.1 Employment, Earnings and Human Capital  
Sluggish growth in labour productivity has been a defining characteristic of the post-
recession period in many developed economies, and notably slow to recover in the UK. 
Figure 2 charts the pattern of output per worker and output per hour in the UK since 2008. 
Previous recessions have shown much stronger growth in productivity.  
Real earnings too fell back sharply after the recession and have scarcely recovered. This 
decline occurred even though the composition of workers shifted towards the more educated 
and older, typically more productive types.3 The fall in real earnings is particularly striking 
after very strong increases in weekly earnings since the mid-1990s. Figure 3 documents this 
strong real earnings growth followed by a significant fall after 2009.  
{Figure 2: Changes to productivity since 2008 (2008Q2=100)} 
 
{Figure 3: Mean weekly earnings since 2001 adjusted for RPI(J)}  
 
The real earnings series displayed in Figure 3 use the RPI(J) price deflator which accounts for 
the fall in mortgage costs as real interest rates adjusted downwards. The figure also shows 
that the overall pattern of real earnings growth in the UK is robust to alternative measures of 
weekly earnings. However, the rise in real earnings in the year following the onset of the 
recession is sensitive to the price index used.  
Although there has been some fall in working hours among younger workers, for the most 
part, the fall in weekly earnings is reproduced in hourly earnings. Indeed, Figure 4 shows that 
it is the real hourly earnings of the young that have fallen back the most. A 9% fall for the 
youngest group with a small rise for the 60+ group. As Figure 5 documents, in contrast to 
																																																						
3	See Cribb and Joyce (2015) updated calculations of Blundell, Crawford and Jin (2014).	
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earlier recessions, unprecedentedly high proportions of employees in the UK experienced 
little in the way of even nominal growth in the 2008-2011 period.  
 
{Figure 4: Median hourly earnings in UK since 2008} 
 
‘Effective’ labour supply, particularly female labour supply, has been higher in the UK 
recently than following previous recessions, due partly to welfare policy changes and long-
run changes in the labour market participation of women, but also partly to long-run real 
wage declines and the fall in the real value of wealth. Some increase of employment can be 
attributed to policy changes; e.g. labour supply has increased among lone parents as a result 
of job search conditions attached to benefit claims, and older workers are retiring later as a 
result of increased State Pension Age (SPA) for women.  
The contrast of employment by age is even more dramatic when viewed across the whole of 
Europe. For example, even in Spain, Figure 6 shows there has been strong growth in 
employment among women aged over 60 despite the severity of unemployment among 
younger age groups. The systematic growth in German employment for this older group of 
women - more than doubling over this period, even outstripped the growth in the UK.  
 
{Figure 5: Some history of the distribution of real hourly earnings in the UK} 
 
The impressive growth in real hourly earnings in the UK in the 10 years prior to the recession 
also coincided with a strong growth in education levels. Figure 7(a) shows the dramatic rise 
across birth cohorts in individuals with university degrees. There is an especially large 
difference in education levels between those born in the late 1960s and those born in the late 
1970s. Naturally, higher education levels can be expected to generate higher earnings.  That 
is what gives rise to the education premium, the gap in earnings between those with a degree 
and those without. What is more surprising is that the education premium shows little sign of 
decline despite the strong increase in education levels across these birth cohorts. This stability 
in the education premium can be seen from Figure 7(b), which plots the average university 
premium by age. The figure also shows the expected strong growth in early career earnings 
experienced by those with university degrees but shows little noticeable impact on this 
premium of the large increases in degree among particular entry cohorts. Blundell, Green and 
Jin (2015) show that this stability in the premium cannot be explained by composition 
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differences. Indeed, the premium goes a long way to explain the average real wage growth 
and growth in labour productivity, experienced before the recession. Although all real wages 
have fallen back in the UK since the recession, the education premium has been maintained 
throughout the post-recession period.  
 
{Figure 6: Employment Rates for European Women Aged 60-64.} 
 
The key role of human capital investments in maintaining earnings and enhancing growth 
during the life-cycle cannot be understated. Skill differences matter enormously for earnings. 
Blundell, Costa-Dias, Meghir and Shaw (2013) find a strong complementarity between 
education levels and wage growth during the working life. The hourly wages of those with 
more skills grow faster and for longer over their working lives. Early investments beget later 
investments as noted by Carneiro and Heckman (2003).  Figure 8 charts the average hourly 
wages (in log units) for UK women by age according to their education level. It shows the 
remarkably strong growth in real hourly wages early in the career of the educated women. 
The higher the education level, the longer the wages grow and the later in working life is the 
point at which they peak. This complementarity between early human capital investments and 
career wages is found to be robust to corrections for selection and endogeneity.  It points to 
the huge potential from human capital investments. Equally, it points to the depressing lack 
of wage growth in work for those workers who leave school with basic levels of education.  
 
{Figure 7 (a): Growth in proportion with degrees or above by age: all workers in UK} 
{Figure 7 (b): Ratio of BA median wage to that of High School (A-level)} 
{Figure 8: Life-Cycle Wage Profiles by Education} 
 
In line with these observations, the descriptive evidence suggests that the number of routine 
jobs near the middle of the earnings distribution has declined steadily. As Figure 9 shows, 
more jobs in the UK are now classified as professional or managerial.  
{Figure 9: Employment shares by occupation group in the UK} 
 
2.2 Family Income and Income Inequality Since the Recession 
During the recession, and immediately after, saw a fall in real earnings for those in work in 
the UK. Employment rates also fell for low-skilled young adults but not for older workers. 
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Figure 10 shows the starkly different evolution of net and private market incomes over the 
post-recession period, with private earned incomes falling much more at the bottom of the 
distribution.  
Over this period, the welfare benefit and tax credit system in the UK was working 
increasingly hard to maintain the incomes of low earners and, despite the rise in earnings 
inequality among workers, income inequality fell. By 2012, average incomes stabilised, but 
the significant falls in previous years left average real incomes some 8.5% below peak, 
reflecting a sharp drop in real earnings driven by large falls in pre-tax earned income of 
households, despite buoyant employment.  
 
{Figure 10: Real private and net income growth, 2007–08 to 2012–13} 
 
2.3 The Pattern of Consumption  
Consumer behaviour is the third and final piece of evidence. Consumption growth reflects 
expectations about the future incomes and future income uncertainty. It is noticeable that falls 
in real consumer expenditure since 2008 were deeper in the UK than in previous recessions. 
Unusually, expenditure on consumer non-durables fell the most, especially among the young 
and, to some extent, among the middle-aged, less for the old. Some of this may well have 
been due to the temporary VAT reduction but it is unlikely to be the main driver of the 
sustained fall in non-durable expenditures.  
{Figure 11: Non-durable spending per capita across UK recessions} 
Figure 11 shows that per capita consumption was still 4% below pre-recession levels at the 
end of 2014. It is also worth noting that the start of the fall is coincident with the fall in GDP 
(not income). Saving ratios have risen since 2008 although they are lower than during the 
early 1980s and early 1990s. The data points to a permanent fall in expected living standards, 
especially among the young and middle-aged. The persistent fall of real labour market 
earnings, together with the announced changes to the value of family benefits and tax credits, 
confirm this and suggest the picture for lower income families will deteriorate rapidly. Recent 
consumption growth is dominated by durable expenditure increases, which suggests families 
are replacing older durables rather than a long-term rise in consumer expenditure levels.  
The recent consumption data from the Understanding Society panel for the UK documents an 
even starker picture. Figure 12 shows a fall in real food expenditure, especially among 
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families with children. This suggests quite a severe cut to the real standard of living of 
younger families. Older households do not display this fall, reflecting the relatively better 
position of older cohorts during this recession.  
{Figure 12: Change in Food Expenditure Distribution and Household type} 
As a final reflection on the pattern of consumer behaviour, it is worth highlighting the growth 
of consumption inequality among younger cohorts. Figure 13 shows a measure of 
consumption inequality plotted against age across different birth cohorts. More recent birth 
cohorts have experienced increasing inequality in their real consumer expenditure, perhaps 
reflecting the changes in long-term inequality of both earned income documented above and 
increasing evidence of the contribution to inequality played by wealth transfers. As Cribb, 
Hood and Joyce (2015) have shown, wealth transfers across generations in the UK accentuate 
inequality. They note that a growing proportion of younger individuals think they will receive 
inheritances, and are also those who already have the highest net wealth. 
{Figure 13: Consumption Inequality by age and birth cohort in the UK} 
 
2.4 What do these trends tell us?  
The story behind these trends in employment, earnings and consumption is revealing and 
somewhat disturbing. At a broad level, the evidence suggests younger workers and families 
in the UK expect a long-run, persistent fall in relative living standards, as evidenced from the 
sustained fall in real per-capita non-durables consumption. Real wages, productivity and 
investment have been slow to pick up, and this suggests that the pattern of lower real wages 
at the bottom is set to continue. The strong complementarity between education investments 
and wage growth suggests that future earnings growth will be concentrated among skilled 
workers.  In terms of reform, growing earnings inequality will place increasing pressure on 
the redistributive parts of the tax and benefit system.  
This means that getting the tax system to raise revenue efficiently and to redistribute 
effectively is a growing priority. But to deliver a coherent policy reform agenda, it is 
important to understand whether, and to what extent, individuals and families respond to the 
underlying incentives in the tax and benefit system. 
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3. Understanding Behaviour: A Life-cycle View  
Empirical research on work incentives has emphasized the need to distinguish between the 
intensive and extensive margins of labour supply - that is between the decision of whether to 
work or not and how much to work. Especially for low earners, responses to tax and welfare 
incentives are larger at the extensive margin—employment—than at the intensive margin—
hours of work. There is an enormous empirical literature on this subject, see Blundell and 
MaCurdy (1999) and Meghir and Phillips (2010), for surveys.  This research has also shown 
clear differences in responses over the life-cycle with strong variation by age, gender and 
family composition. Larger responses are found among those leaving education, among 
mothers with young children, and among older workers, especially those in their late 50s and 
60s.  
There has also recently been a flurry of important contributions that build on this life-cycle 
view, noting that, although responses may appear small at certain points in the life-cycle, 
there are other points where they are not. Blundell, Bozio and Laroque (2011) develop this 
argument using data from the UK, US and France. Figure 14 is an example of their findings, 
showing strong similarities in average employment among prime-aged men across all three 
countries but stark differences at labour market entry and around retirement. The argument is 
that labour supply viewed over the whole life-cycle can be quite responsive to taxes, even for 
those who appear not to respond to changes in incentives early in the working career, see 
Ljundqvist and Sargent (2011) and references therein. In this analysis, tax reforms can 
substantively alter total hours and effort over the lifetime.  
{ Figure 14: Male Employment by Age in the UK, US and France, 2007} 
Added to this is a greater focus on the interaction between human capital investments and 
labour supply. In a lifetime framework it is natural to account for responses in educational 
and on-the-job investments alongside labour supply. Human capital investments increase the 
pay-off to work and enhance earnings over the working life.  Drawing on a long line of 
research relating experience capital and future wages, Keane and Rogerson (2012) argue 
convincingly that allowing for human capital increases the responsiveness of labour supply to 
tax changes, and that these effects differ over the life-cycle.  
The life-cycle human-capital setting for the analysis of labour supply responses is hardly 
new, see Heckman (1976) for a key early exposition, however it does seem deserving of 
further integration with the general analysis of supply-side reforms to tax, welfare and social 
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insurance. As we noted earlier, the pay-off to human capital investments may be greater 
among workers with already higher initial educational investments - early human capital 
investments beget future skill development, see Heckman and Cairnero (2003). 
Before moving to a more detailed examination of the evidence on life-cycle behaviour, it is 
worth noting that the focus here on hours, employment and human capital responses to 
reform should not detract from other key ways that earnings respond to tax policy. For 
example, when it comes to the taxation of top incomes and the self-employed, concerns about 
the tax base come back into play. Indeed, Feldstein (1995, 1999) makes a convincing case for 
looking directly at taxable income. The more opportunities for exemptions and deductions 
and the possibility to pass income through other lower tax jurisdictions, the more difficult it is 
to raise revenue from the top income earners. As Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) note, a higher 
tax rate on a smaller base will raise less revenue and will probably be harder to sustain. In 
general, taxes on earnings should always be viewed as part of the whole ‘tax system’ 
acknowledging, in particular, interactions with capital and consumption taxation. 
 
3.1 Younger workers and families 
Empirical evidence suggests that younger workers with little formal education are likely to 
experience a low pay-off from ‘on the job’ human capital investments. This appears to be the 
case whether these investments are passive ‘learning by doing’ or active training investments.  
This simply reflects the complementarity between human capital investments of the kind 
explored in Heckman and Cairnero (2003).  Consequently, in buoyant economic times at 
least, young low-educated workers have little ‘dynamic work incentive’ to stay in work over 
and above the current period work incentives. Typically though, we see that they face 
important nonlinearities and disincentives in the tax and welfare benefit system, brought 
about through the interaction and overlap of the tax, tax credit and welfare systems, 
especially if they have children. These key interactions have been documented extensively 
for the UK in the Mirrlees Review (2012), but they are equally important in many countries. 
Figure 15 is an example of a budget set facing a single mother in the US.  
{Figure 15: Universally Available Tax and Transfer Benefits in US} 
The complexity of the tax system may not always be apparent from the income tax schedule 
itself, but note that what really matters for work incentives is the total amount of earnings 
taken in tax and withdrawn benefits—the effective tax rate. As Figure 15 exemplifies for the 
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US, the schedule of effective tax rates can be highly complicated by the many interactions 
between income taxes, earnings-related social security contributions by employers, welfare 
benefits, and tax credits. What is really important in designing tax rate schedules is to take 
account of empirical evidence on the impact of the effective tax schedule, implicit in the 
whole budget constraint, on the behavior of different groups of people. Of course, it is also 
important to account for take-up/awareness of welfare and tax credit entitlements, as in 
Keane and Moffitt (1998), for example. 
It is likely that younger low-educated workers will be closer to the participation margin, than 
for their more educated counterparts, making them particularly sensitive to incentives at the 
extensive margin. The literature on labour supply responses for low education workers 
suggests moderately high extensive margin elasticities, especially for women with younger 
children, and rather lower intensive margin elasticities (often also pointing to important 
income effects for such groups), see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).  This combination of 
intensive and extensive elasticities can then be used to argue for the introduction and/or 
expansion of EITC style subsidy programmes for certain groups of low wage workers, see 
Brewer, Saez and Shephard (2010) and references therein.  Perhaps the most responsive at the 
extensive margin are low-educated mothers returning to work after having a child. This has 
been well documented in the empirical literature and remains a key point in the design of 
work incentives for low-wage workers. Noting this, Blundell and Shephard (2012) suggest 
‘tagging’ implicit tax rates in tax credits and in the taper rate of means-tested benefits 
according to the age of children.  
Children play a key role in this discussion. Even though fertility decisions are assumed 
exogenous to the tax system in the work discussed so far (which may be an assumption worth 
relaxing, see Keane and Wolpin, 2010), the reforms that follow from these ‘Mirrlees’ style 
arguments often argue for targeted wage subsidies that encourage work among young low-
educated women. Of course, there are other arguments made to justify these policies, see 
Moffitt (2005) for a discussion.  
If early childhood investments by parents are a key to future child development, subsidising 
work for low-educated mothers with younger children, might seem counter-productive. 
However, if human capital begets human capital from one generation to the next, then this 
concern may be less forceful, see Heckman (2011). Instead, the early child human capital 
investment argument might suggest targeted subsidies or targeted loans for good quality 
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childcare to complement earnings incentives for low wage parents and enhance human capital 
investments for their children. 
3.2 Human capital investments and the higher educated 
Human capital investment decisions have often been left to one side in arguments about 
labour supply incentives. But progressive taxes reduce the incentives to acquire education, 
and to invest in human capital over the working life. They do so in two ways. First, by 
reducing the expected return to education. Second, by insuring against very low wage 
outcomes that might otherwise occur for workers with low education levels. Blundell et al. 
(2013) show both of these aspects to be potentially important considerations in incentives for 
high school and university enrolment. On the flip-side, targeted financial incentives to remain 
in education for those with low-income parents have been met with some success, see 
Dearden, Emmerson and Meghir (2009), for example. The degree to which progressive taxes 
do reduce education investments should be a key component in tax policy design.  
Human capital investments take two forms – formal education and on-the-job investments. 
As we saw for the UK women in Figure 9, the hourly wages of those with more education 
grow for longer into their working lives. The higher the education level, the longer the wages 
grow and the higher they peak. What recent research has also found (Imae and Keane, 2004, 
and Blundell, Costa-Dias, Meghir and Shaw, 2013, for example), is that on-the-job 
investments tend to be ‘complementary’ to formal educational investments. Education 
complements experience capital, increasing earnings and extending the life-cycle profile, 
thereby making early retirement less advantageous.4  
The complementarity in human capital investments implies that for those younger workers 
who have acquired higher levels of formal education before entering the labour market, there 
is an enhanced dynamic incentive for work. This adds to the static current period incentives 
for work, a point that has been highlighted by Keane (2009).5  The idea that human capital 
investments enhance incentives to work, and to work for longer, is perhaps no surprise, see 
Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) and references therein. For educated workers, 
employment generates valuable experience, which more than likely depreciates with time out 
																																																						
4	There is also some evidence that this complementarity extends to workplace qualification training 
too, see Blundell, Dearden and Meghir (1996).	
5	Added to this, Blundell et al. (2013) find that part-time work produces little in the way of experience 
pay-off, at least for the UK women in their sample. This part-time experience penalty adds to the 
other arguments as to why part-time work is often found to be less financially rewarding.	
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of the labour market. Consequently, few educated younger workers will be near the 
participation margin and are unlikely to respond very much to employment incentives or 
disincentives in the tax system while they are young. But seen from a lifetime labour supply 
perspective, the overall impact of taxation on the career length and earnings profile of higher 
educated workers will be significant. Incentives for early retirement then act to reduce the 
incentive to acquire human capital.  
3.3 Older workers 
Even those with high human capital investments are likely to become more responsive to 
incentives at the extensive margin as they approach retirement. The differences in 
employment at older ages have already been highlighted in Figure 14. This pattern of 
responsiveness over the lifetime is confirmed in French and Jones (2012), who develop a 
micro-data based model of retirement choices, allowing for the disincentives in social 
security and medical insurance at the individual level. They find substantially higher labour 
supply responses at the extensive margin among older workers in the US. Reductions in work 
disincentives have much larger impacts for older workers than for younger workers.. The fact 
that work decisions among older workers are more responsive to incentives has been 
documented in many studies. These include the cross-country studies of Gruber and Wise 
(1999) which focus on the post 55 age group and the more macro-based studies, see Rogerson 
and Wallenius (2009).  
A dominant characteristic of the evidence on older workers is the strong variation in labour 
supply for men and for women in their late 50s and 60s. In the UK, for example, Banks and 
Casanova (2003) show that individuals who are at the extremes of the wealth distribution – 
the relatively poor and wealthy - are more likely to leave employment early than those in the 
middle of the wealth distribution. Broadly speaking, the poor are more likely to move onto 
disability benefits, while those with higher levels of pension and financial wealth are more 
likely to retire early and live on private pension income. Those in the middle are more likely 
to remain in paid work. Chandler and Tetlow (2014) show that these differences, especially 
among the low wealth, have largely survived through the recession.  
This literature on older workers suggests a greater focus on lifetime careers, e.g. Ljundqvist 
and Sargent (2011), and on the lifetime pay-off to human capital investment, e.g. Keane and 
Rogerson (2012).   
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4 Prospects for Reform  
This paper began with two questions: What has happened to living standards and inequality? 
Where will tax and welfare reform have most impact? The evidence reported here shows that 
the great recession resulted in long-run declines in real earnings, much more so than in 
previous recessions. Although the real earnings of most occupations and most age groups 
have experienced declines over this period, the largest declines in the UK have been 
experienced among the young and lower educated. The wage premium for those with 
university degrees in the UK was maintained during the education expansion prior to the 
recession and, reassuringly, has shown little sign of falling back since the recession even 
though educated workers continue to form an increasing proportion of the working age 
population. Moreover, the education premium has been to shown to grow strongly over the 
working life.  
The trends in earnings add to underlying inequality and put additional strain on the welfare 
benefit and tax credit system. They point to a key role for human capital in maintaining 
earnings over ever extending working lives. Overall, the analysis suggests a focus on human 
capital investment with longer-term earnings growth most likely coming from high-skilled 
occupations. 
Younger families have reacted to these long-run declines in their earnings potential by 
reducing their real consumption levels. For those at the bottom of the earnings distribution 
with little wealth, incomes can only be maintained in the immediate future through a 
combination of increases in family labour supply and an increased reliance on the welfare 
benefit and tax-credit system.  Any reduction in the real value of family benefits can only 
make things worse.  
How then should we best design policy to increase overall employment and earnings over the 
working life and address growing underlying inequality? The empirical evidence reviewed 
here6 suggests that work incentives, especially at the extensive margin, are strongest for 
parents with early school age children, and for older workers. For the young, the policy 
design issue is to avoid young individuals leaving education too early and experiencing spells 
neither in work nor education. We have seen that financial incentives to stay in high school 
for those with poor family backgrounds can play a role in this regard too. In general, work 
decisions for the young lower educated do appear sensitive to incentives in the tax and 
																																																						
6	See Blundell (2012), for more detail. 
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benefit system, see Meghir and Philips (2010). Encouraging investment in human capital 
improves the pay-off to work and ensures earnings grow, and hold up longer, throughout the 
working life. 
For older workers, work decisions are particularly responsive to taxes. Reducing 
disincentives to work for people in their late 50s and 60s, implicit in social security 
retirement ages, earnings tests, disability insurance and medical insurance provisions, can 
strongly improve incentives to stay in work for longer and improve incentives to invest in 
human capital too. The more welfare benefits can be linked to contributions, the less 
distortionary they become. 
This research suggests that the key to improving the trends in employment, hours and 
earnings in the longer-run will be to focus tax and welfare policy reform on labour market 
entry, on retirement and on human capital. The arguments point toward a blueprint for a 
policy reform agenda that takes a life-cycle view of work and human capital accumulation. 
Tax and welfare policy should be re-designed to acknowledge that work incentives operate 
most effectively at certain key points in the life-cycle, enhancing the flow into work for those 
leaving education and for returning mothers after childbirth, while maintaining work among 
those in their late 50s and 60s. These margins are precisely where labour supply has been 
shown to be responsive to tax policy incentives and, consequently, where it may also be best 
to focus policies aimed at reducing distortions. Human capital policy plays a complementary 
role, improving both productivity and the payoff to work, while ensuring stronger earnings 
growth over a lifetime. 
With growing underlying inequality and increased pressure on government revenues, the 
required reforms, although increasingly necessary, are also increasingly likely to face short-
term political barriers. To quote Besley (2015), ‘high levels of inequality can skew the 
priorities of the state by limiting its capacity to act effectively’. The great recession has not 
changed this reform agenda, instead it has highlighted the urgency for coherent tax and 
welfare reform.   
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Figure 1. UK Income Inequality: 50/10, 90/50 and 99/90 ratios 
 
Notes: Income has been measured before housing costs have been deducted. Years refer to calendar years 
up to and including 1992 and to financial years from 1993–94 onwards. 
Source: Cribb et al., 2013; Family Resources Survey and Family Expenditure Survey, various years; 
supplemented by the administrative tax return data from the Survey of Personal Incomes for the 1%.  
 
Figure 2: Changes to productivity since 2008 (2008Q2=100) 
 
Source: Cribb and Joyce (2015). 
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Figure 3: Mean weekly earnings since 2001 adjusted for RPI(J) inflation (indexed to 100 
in 2008Q1) 
 
Source: Cribb and Joyce (2015). 
 
Figure 4: Median hourly earnings in UK since 2008 (indexed to 100 in 2008Q1) 
 
Source: Cribb and Joyce (2015). Calculations using ASHE.  
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Figure 5: Some history of the distribution of real hourly earnings in the UK 
 
Source: Blundell, Crawford and Jin (2014). Calculations using ASHE.  
Figure 6: Employment Rates for European Women Aged 60-64. 
 
Source: Blundell, Crawford and Jin (2014).  
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Figure 7 (a): Growth in proportion with degrees or above by age: all workers in UK.
 
Source: Blundell, Green and Jin (2015).  
 
Figure 7 (b): Ratio of BA median wage to that of High School (A-level) 
 
Source: Blundell, Green and Jin (2015).  
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Figure 8: Life-Cycle Wage Profiles by Education 
 
Notes: Log average hourly wages by age for UK women workers across education levels.  
Source: BHPS and Blundell, Costa-Dias, Meghir and Shaw (2013).  
 
 
Figure 9: Employment shares by occupation group in the UK 
 
 
Source: Blundell, Green and Jin (2015).  
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Figure 10: Real private and net income growth, 2007–08 to 2012–13 
 
Source: Belfield, Cribb, Hood and Joyce (2014). 
 
 
Figure 11: Non-durable spending per capita across UK recessions  
 
Source: Calculations by O’Dea, 2015.  
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Figure 12: Change in Food Expenditure Distribution and Household type: 2010 to 2013 
 
Source: Understanding Society. Calculations by Etheridge, 2015.  
 
Figure 13: Consumption Inequality (variance of log consumption) by age and birth 
cohort in the UK.  
 
Source: Adams, Brewer and O'Dea C. (2015). 
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Figure 14: Male Employment by Age in the UK, US and France, 2007  
 
 
Source: Blundell, Bozio and Laroque (2011).  
 
Figure 15: Universally Available Tax and Transfer Benefits in US 
(Single Parent with Two Children, 2008) 
 
Source: Urban Institute (NTJ, Dec 2012).  
Notes: Value of tax and value transfer benefits for a single parent with two children. 
